Shadow Economy and Tax Morality: Is There A Difference Between Genders?

  • Dr. Birgit Burböck FH JOANNEUM – University of Applied Sciences, Eggenberger Allee 11, 8020 Graz, Austria
Keywords: shadow economy, slippery slope model, gender differences

Abstract

One of the driving forces of a shadow economy are tax rates and tax morale. The slippery slope framework as a conceptual tool integrates economic and psychological determinants and shows that tax compliance is influenced by (i) trust in authorities and (ii) power of authorities, (iii) voluntary tax compliance, and (iv) enforced tax compliance. Based on the taxpayer’s honesty, the quality of compliance is different. A difference of compliance may occur between gender. We propose insights into possible gender differences with the assumptions of the Slippery Slope Framework with a sample of 656 respondents; 315 male and 341 female respondents. No significant difference between male and female was identified for voluntary tax compliance, while a significant difference was found for the enforced tax compliance.

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Published
2019-05-15
How to Cite
Burböck , B. (2019) “Shadow Economy and Tax Morality: Is There A Difference Between Genders? ”, Mednarodno inovativno poslovanje = Journal of Innovative Business and Management, 11(1), pp. 3-10. doi: 10.32015/JIMB/2019-11-1-1.
Section
Original article